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ABSTRACT
While Americans are less healthy than Europeans along some dimensions (like obesity), Americans
are significantly less likely to smoke than their European counterparts. This difference emerged in
the 1970s and it is biggest among the most educated. The puzzle becomes larger once we account
for cigarette prices and anti-smoking regulations, which are both higher in Europe. There is a
nonmonotonic relationship between smoking and income; among richer countries and people, higher
incomes are associated with less smoking. This can account for about one-fifth of the U.S./Europe
difference. Almost one-half of the smoking difference appears to be the result of differences in
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Americans have one of the lowest smoking rates in the developed world.  As Figure 1 
shows, 19.1 percent of adult Americans smoke, as opposed to 34 percent of Germans or 
Japanese and 27 percent of the French or English.  The American smoking rate is 10 
percent less than the average among developed nations shown in the figure.  This is the 
lowest rate in this sample apart from Sweden.  This remarkable abstinence is all the more 
remarkable because there are many other areas where Americans are not notable for the 
healthy behavior.  For example, among the same sample of countries, America has easily 
the highest obesity rate (see Figure 2), and our consumption of alcohol per adult is in the 
mean of the sample.
1  In this essay, we try to understand why smoking is so low in the 
United States.    
 
America’s abstinence from tobacco is not some long-standing aspect of U.S. culture; 
rather, it is very recent.  As Figure 3 illustrates, over the 20
th century, cigarette smoking 
in the U.S. saw a remarkable rise from 267 cigarettes per capita in 1914 to over 4,300 
cigarettes per capita in 1963 before plummeting to just over 2000 per capita today.  
Through the 1960s, the U.S. had much higher per capita tobacco consumption than any 
Western European country.  Figure 4 plots smoking rates per adult in 2000 on smoking 
rates in 1980 across countries.  The line is the 45 degree line, so the distance between the 
point and line shows the extent that smoking declined between 1980 and 2000.  America 
had the largest drop of any non-Scandinavian country in the sample.    
 
We examine three potential explanations for the low level of smoking in the U.S. relative 
to other developed countries.  First, we ask whether the effective price of cigarettes, 
which reflects both taxes and other regulations on tobacco, is higher in the U.S.  Second, 
we look at whether higher American income levels might explain the lower level of U.S. 
cigarette consumption, if better health is a luxury good. Third, we ask whether 
                                                 
1 This fact might suggest that American obesity and smoking are, in fact, negatively linked, where 
reductions in smoking led to higher obesity.  There is little evidence to support this view.  In general, across 
people there is no correlation between smoking and obesity (Cutler and Glaeser, 2005) and across countries 
the correlation is also essentially zero.   differences in beliefs about the consequences of smoking might be responsible for 
American exceptionalism.   
 
It is clearly not the case that low cigarette smoking in the U.S. is the result of higher 
cigarette prices. Cigarettes are, on average, 37 percent cheaper in the U.S. than in the 
European Union.  For example, the average price per pack in the United Kingdom
2 is 
$6.25 while the average price per pack in the U.S. is $3.60.  The average tax per pack is 
86 cents in the U.S. and 206 cents in France.  Using standard estimates of the elasticity of 
cigarette consumption with respect to price, these facts suggest that holding everything 
else constant, Americans would smoke 20 percent more than Europeans.  Cross-national 
results on regulation are similar.  If anything, tobacco consumption in the U.S. is less 
regulated than in most European countries, and controlling for regulation only makes 
American exceptionalism more extreme. 
 
The relationship between income and cigarette consumption across countries is non-
linear.  Cigarette consumption first rises with income and then declines.  Our model in 
section 2 suggests that this can be interpreted as the confluence of two opposing effects: 
higher income levels make it easier to afford more cigarettes, and also increase the costs 
of death and disease.  Within country estimates of income elasticities are much smaller 
than these cross-country estimates.  As such, the ability of income differences to explain 
smoking differences between the U.S. and Europe depends primarily on one’s beliefs 
about micro vs. macro estimates of income elasticities.  If one believes that there is a 
social multiplier so that macro estimates are indeed many times higher than micro 
estimates, and the estimated macro estimates are correct, then income differences can 
explain roughly one-quarter of the U.S./Europe difference.  If one believes that the micro-
estimates are correct and the macro estimates are spurious reflections of omitted 
variables, then income differences can, at best, explain one tenth of the U.S/Europe 
difference.   
 
                                                 
2  These are legal prices.  There may be some smuggling of cigarettes in the UK, which we do not account 
for. Finally, we turn to differences in beliefs about the health effects of smoking between the 
U.S. and Europe.  Public opinion surveys suggest that Americans have some of the 
strongest beliefs that cigarettes are extremely harmful.  Furthermore, there is an 
extremely strong negative correlation across individuals between beliefs about the harms 
of smoking and smoking, and a somewhat weaker correlation between the same variables 
across countries.  Of course, cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982) suggests 
that this relationship might exist because smokers like to think that their habit isn’t 
harmful.  To address this possibility, we look only at beliefs among non-smokers, and 
again find a relationship between beliefs and smoking.  Even among non-smokers, the 
US has some of the strongest anti-smoking beliefs.   
 
A simple decomposition suggests that these belief differences can explain between one-
quarter and one-half of the difference in smoking rates between the U.S. and Europe.  We 
present some evidence suggesting that these differences in beliefs are themselves the 
result of concerted government action emphasizing the harms of smoking.   
 
In the next section, we present a brief model that sets out the potential causes of lower 
cigarette consumption in the United States. In Section III, we review the evidence on 
price, tax and regulation differences between the U.S. and Europe.  Section IV examines 
the relationship between income and cigarette consumption, showing that up to one-
quarter of the difference between the U.S. and Europe can be explained by higher income 
in the United States.  Finally, Section V discusses the causes and consequences of 
differences in beliefs about the health consequences of smoking.  The last section 
concludes.   
 
II.  Theoretical Determinants of Smoking 
 
In this section, we present a simple model of cigarette consumption, beliefs and income, 
and use the model to theories we shall test.  We assume a discrete time model where 
individuals receive income Y in each period.  Individuals discount the future with 
discount factor b .  To focus on the key issues, we assume there is no borrowing or lending between periods and the only decision in each period is whether or not to smoke.  
Smoking is a one-zero choice that carries financial cost of  C P  and yields utility of S, 
which differs across individuals.  
 
In each period, the probability of surviving until the next period is believed to d  for non-
smokers and  D - d  for smokers.  These beliefs can be changed, but we assume they are 
the same for everyone at a point in time.  The utility flow if dead is normalized to zero. 
The flow of utility for non-smokers is U(Y) and the flow of utility for smokers equals 
( ) S P Y U C + -  .  The stationary nature of this problem means (somewhat 
counterfactually) that individuals will always make the same decision about smoking 
each period.  Total expected discounted utility for smokers equals:   ( )
) ( 1 D - -
+ -
d b
S P Y U C  and 
for non-smokers equals  ( )
bd - 1
Y U
 .  Smokers trade off the flow benefits of enjoying 
cigarettes against both the cash costs of smoking and the costs in terms of lost health.  
With these assumptions, Proposition 1 follows:  
 
Proposition 1:  There exists a value of S>0, denoted S*, at which individuals are 
indifferent between smoking and not-smoking.  Individuals with values of S greater than 
S* strictly prefer smoking and individuals with values of S less than S* strictly prefer not 
smoking. The value of S* is rising with  C P , b , d  and D.   
 
The value of S* suggests that the population will be split between those who smoke and 
those who don’t smoke based on the heterogeneous preference for tobacco.  If S is 
distributed with a cumulative distribution F(S) and density f(S), then the share of people 
who smoke will equal 1-F(S*), and an increase in S* will cause smoking to fall by –
f(S*).     
 
The comparative statics of the model are straightforward.  Since greater mortality risk is a 
primary cost of cigarette consumption, people who are more patient and value the future 
more will smoke less.  Rising prices will generally cause fewer cigarettes to be consumed.  Higher taxes on cigarettes will raise prices and should reduce consumption.  
Some regulations, as bans on smoking indoors, may also act to raise the effective cost of 
consuming cigarettes, though regulations could matter through other channels as well. 
 
The comparative statics on d can be seen as reflecting the complementarities across 
health risks.  When individuals have a low probability of survival (i.e. a low value of d ), 
then the health costs of smoking are discounted heavily, and smoking becomes more 
attractive.  If one is likely to die from other reasons, one tends to worry less about the 
harms from smoking.
3  The comparative static on D can be interpreted as either relating 
to the actual impact of cigarette smoking on health or to the perceived impact of cigarette 
smoking on health.  As individuals perceive that cigarettes are more harmful, they will 
smoke less.    
 
The comparative static on income is somewhat more complex:  
 
Proposition 2:  The value of S* is rising with Y if and only if  ( )
( ) Y U
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Income has two important effects on consumption, which work in opposite directions.  
Higher levels of income mean that the cash cost of cigarettes is less important; thus, there 
will be higher smoking as people get richer.  Countervailing this, however, is that the 
value of life increases with income and this will lead to less smoking.  Under some cases 
– when the health effect becomes relatively more important as income rises – these two 
effects can lead to a non-monotonic relationship between income and cigarette 
consumption.  This will be the case if, for example, U(.) is a power function.   
 
                                                 
3  The heavy use of cigarettes among soldiers during wartime may be one particular example of this 
phenomenon.   To further investigate the comparative static on beliefs about the harms of smoking, we 
examine how beliefs about smoking interact with other characteristics of individuals.  
Our next proposition describes how changes in Daffects different groups sorted along 
other margins.    
 
Proposition 3:  An increase in D will cause a greater decrease in smoking among: (i) 
those with higher income; (ii) those with a higher baseline probability of survival (d ); 
and (iii) those who are more patient (a higher value of b ).    
 
Proposition 3 tells us that if there is a change in beliefs about the mortality risks of 
smoking then we should expect to see a greater reduction in smoking among people who 
are rich, patient or likely to live long lives if they don’t smoke.  The intuition behind 
these results is that the value of living longer is greater for those who value the future 
highly, or who are likely to live or who get more utility from living.  Thus, information 
suggesting a way to live longer will be adopted more readily by those groups.   
 
This effect is very different from the effect of an increase in prices.  Because rich people 
care relatively more about survival and less about additional cash outlays than the poor, 
prices should have a smaller impact on the rich than on the poor.  Price increases will 
have the same effect on people who differ only in discount rates or baseline levels of 
survival.  We state this, and related results, formally in proposition 4.  
 
Proposition 4:  An increase in the price of cigarettes,  C P  , will cause a greater decrease in 
the share of the less rich that smoke.  Cigarette price increases will have the same effect 
on people with different discount rates or different baseline levels of survival.       
 
Propositions 3 and 4 offer a general test of whether differences in smoking between the 
U.S. and Europe differ because of beliefs or prices.  If beliefs differ, then we should 
expect the reduction in U.S. smoking to be concentrated among the wealthy, patient and 
healthy.  If prices differ, then we should expect differences in smoking to be concentrated among the poor and we should expect no differences in groups on the basis of health or 
patience.   
 
Finally, we extend the model to allow for social interactions in smoking.  We assume that 
utility from smoking equals  s smo Share g S ker · +  where S is an individual specific taste for 
smoking and g is a constant which reflects the impact of having other smokers to interact 
with.  Smoking interactions might occur because of social norms (smoking among non-
smokers becomes stigmatized) or because of habit persistence in tobacco consumption 
(being around smoke increases the desire to smoke).  It is straightforward to show that: 
 
As in Propositions 3 and 4, we assume that there is always someone who smokes and 
someone who doesn’t smoke, and that  g S S > - , where S  and  S are the upper and 
lower bounds of the taste for smoking.  This implies that:  
 
Proposition 5:  The share of the population in a country that smokes will be declining 
with  C P , b , d  and D , and the negative impact of these variables on smoking will be 
larger with g.  Assuming that the distribution of tastes for smoking is uniform within the 
population on the interval [ ] S S,  and that there is always someone who smokes, the 





 times the impact of 
these variables within groups.  
  
As is usual, positive complementarities cause there to be a social multiplier, so that 
exogenous characteristics that affect smoking become quantitatively more important 
Becker and Murphy, 2000, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 2003).  As a result, 
within country estimates of coefficients may understate the importance that these 
coefficients can have on cross-country smoking patterns.   
  Our model suggests a relatively straightforward empirical implementation.  We estimate 
equations for smoking at the individual and group level, relating the smoking decision to 
income, prices, and beliefs about the harms of tobacco.  The regression is of the form: 
 
(1)  Income Belief ice Share Income Belief ice Smo b b b a + + + = Pr Pr ker  
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Our objective is to provide estimates of the differences in cigarette prices, beliefs about 
cigarette risks, and income between the U.S. and the European Union, as well as to 
estimate the impact of these variables on the share of the population that smokes.  With 
these estimates we can decompose the difference in smoking patterns between the U.S. 
and Europe.  
 
III.  Data 
 
Data on tobacco consumption are plentiful, but not always consistent.  Almost all 
countries have some data on tobacco consumption, typically from national surveys.  We 




For some of our analyses, we wish to examine subgroups of the population, for example 
by income or education.  While most surveys will have such data, tabulations of national 
data frequently do not contain such detail.  In addition, we want to know about beliefs 
about the harms of smoking, which are measured far less frequently.  For these analyses, 
we use the Eurobarometer survey in 1994, matched with the US National Survey of Drug 
                                                 
4 See especially the World Health Organization’s Health for All Database, http://www.euro.who.int/hfadb. Use and Health of the same year.  Unfortunately, Eurobarometer did not survey all 
countries.  Thus, we are restricted to 14 European countries in these analyses.   
 
In addition, average smoking rates from the Eurobarometer data are somewhat different 
from average smoking in official national data.  For the 14 countries with both sources of 
data, the correlation coefficient is 0.50.  The greatest difference is in Denmark, where 
official data from a survey conducted by PLS Consult and the Danish Council on 
Smoking and Health show substantially smoking rates that are 11 percentage points less 
than the Eurobarometer data.  It is possible that differences in specific questions or 
samples explain these differences, though we cannot be sure without access to the raw 
data.  Other large differences are in France, Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands.  We use 
the reported national data as we can, to ensure the largest possible sample size, and use 
the Eurobarometer data for questions involving socioeconomic aspects of smoking or 
beliefs about the harms of smoking.  Fortunately, the two estimates are relatively similar 
when we substitute one for the other.. 
 
As shown below, income has a large and non-linear effect on smoking.  When we 
examine bivariate relationships between smoking and other factors (prices, regulations, or 
beliefs), it is important to have a relatively homogeneous sample of countries by income.  
Within Europe, the major income outlier is Greece, with a per capita income that is 60 
percent below the European average ($10,607 in Greece versus $25,858 in Europe in 
2000) and 25 percent below the next lowest country (Spain, at $14,138).  For this reason, 
we omit Greece from many of our regressions, though we present raw data for Greece in 
the tables and show the country in the figures. 
 
IV.  Differences in Prices, Taxes and Regulation between the U.S. and Europe 
 
A long economic literature on smoking has focused on the impact of cigarette prices on 
smoking.  This literature began by using time series data within the U.S. (Schoenberg, 
1933) and expanded to looking at cross-state variation created by differences in excise 
taxes (Maier, 1955).  More modern estimates have become increasingly sophisticated and relate cigarette smoking to either lagged or expected cigarette prices (Baltagi and Levin, 
1986, Becker, Grossman and Murphy, 1994).  The most compelling estimates follow 
Lyan and Simon (1968) and use within state variation, examining the response of 
consumption to a change in the state excise tax on cigarettes.
5   
 
Lyan and Simon (1968) estimate the price elasticity of smoking at -.51.  Chaloupka 
(1991) estimates long run price elasticities between -.27 and -.36 for the entire 
population.  As Proposition 4 in the previous section suggests, Chaloupka finds higher 
price elasticities for poorer members of society.  Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) 
estimate short-run price elasticities ranging from -.36 to -.44 and long-run price 
elasticities ranging from -.73 to -.79.   Gallet and List (2002) perform a meta-analysis of 
papers on cigarette demand and find a mean price elasticity of -.48.  While there is a 
considerable range from -.27 to -79, these estimates all suggest that differential cigarette 
prices can explain differences in cigarette consumption over time and space.   
 
The first two columns of Table 2 show prices and excise taxes across developed countries 
in 2000 (in US dollars). The last column reports the price of cigarettes relative to the cost 
of 1 kilogram of bread – the normalization correcting for value added taxes on other 
commodities that might distort consumption decisions.  These prices are the price of the 
cheapest national brand, and do not account for any smuggling or non-market 
transactions.  Stories of such transactions are present in some countries abound.  For 
example in 2002 the Italian police allegedly broke up a smuggling ring that smuggled 
three million Euros worth of cigarettes from Romania into Italy each month.
6  However, 
data on illegal sales are not generally available.   
 
The table makes clear that price differences cannot explain why Americans smoke less 
than Europeans.  Nominal cigarette prices are higher in the US than abroad, but prices 
relative to other commodities are lower.  At least part of this is because the tax on 
cigarettes is much lower in the US than in much of Europe.  Indeed, cigarette prices are 
                                                 
5  These results seem reasonably persuasive despite the possible endogeneity problem – high taxes might be 
put in place when states are experiencing an exogenous decline in cigarette smoking. 
6  See http://www.crji.org/arhiva/e_020312.htm generally higher in Europe than in the US.  Relative to other commodities, prices in the 
US are 37 percent lower than in Europe.  With an elasticity of -.5, this implies that 
smoking should be nearly 20 percent greater in the U.S.   
 
As Figure 5 shows, there is little correlation across countries between the cost of 
cigarettes (measured relative to the cost of bread) and cigarette consumption across 
developed countries.  Indeed, the U.S. has both relatively low prices and relatively low 
consumption.  The regression line is slightly positive, although not statistically 
significant.  While it is possible that forces like greater smuggling of cigarettes in Europe 
than in the U.S. might mean that our price estimates overstate the differences across 
countries, the graph makes it clear that it is extremely unlikely that the U.S. actually has 
much higher cigarette prices than other countries. 
 
Cash outlays are one component of cigarette costs; the time cost is another.  Evans, 
Farrelly and Montgomery (1999) have shown that workplace bans on smoking have a 
significant impact on cigarette consumption within the U.S.  The bans are effective, at 
least in part, because they raise the cost of smoking.  We also calculated a regulation 
index within the U.S. based on the number of types of places where cigarette smoking is 
banned: government workplaces, private workplaces and restaurants.  We assign a 1 to 
each state where smoking is prohibited, a 0.5 to each state where smoking is restricted to 
specific areas, and a 0 if there is no regulation.  As a simple summary measure, we sum 
the presence of a ban in the three settings.  The data to construct the regulatory index 
come from the Center for Disease Control.   
 
As Figure 6 shows, there is a negative 38 percent correlation coefficient between this 
regulation index and the share of smokers in a state.  A statistically significant negative 
relationship result persists even when we control for a wide range of other controls 
including tobacco prices and income.  As such, it is at least possible that greater 
regulation of smoking in the U.S. might be a cause of the lower smoking rate in America.   
 To make cross country comparisons, we look at the same government regulations across 
European countries.  Data on cigarette restrictions come from the World Health 
Organization Tobacco Control Database.  While there are some discrepancies between 
these reports and what we know about regulation in the U.S., we have decided to use the 
WHO estimates rather than to create our other alternative measures.  These measures are 
generally corroborated by the World Bank data as well.
7 
 
Table 3 lists the principle forms of regulation on tobacco usage in public places in the 
United States and the European nations.  In each case, we give the country a 1 if smoking 
is prohibited in that setting, a 0.5 if there are partial restrictions or voluntary agreements, 
and 0 if there is no regulation.  It is apparent that the U.S. is not particularly regulatory.  
The U.S. does have some regulations on consumption in public places, but most 
European countries do as well.  While it is possible that U.S. regulations are more 
seriously enforced than their European counterparts, and certainly the US has private 
restrictions on smoking in workplaces that may be less prevalent in other countries, the 
U.S. doesn’t stand out relative to the other countries in formal regulations.  Indeed, the 
average of the index for the European Union is 1.97, compared to the value of 1.0 in the 
U.S.  Since the U.S. is less regulated than the European Union, it seems hard to believe 
that this variable explains less American smoking. 
 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between our regulation index and smoking rates across 
countries.  As the regression lines shows, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the two.  A literal interpretation of this regression suggests that regulations are 
irrelevant for smoking decisions.  Of course, the evidence provided by Evans et al. (1999) 
and the US states provides far more compelling results that regulation does matter.   
Rather, we interpret the cross-country results as suggesting that measurement of 
regulations and their enforcement at the country level are so noisy that it is impossible to 
say anything cleanly about the role of regulation in smoking.  While our conclusions thus 
need to be interpreted with some care, the U.S. does not appear to tax or regulate tobacco 
                                                 
7 See http://www1.worldbank.org/tobacco/brieflist_db.asp consumption particularly highly, making these explanations unlikely to account for the 
lower smoking rate in the US.    
 
V.  Income and U.S./Europe Differences 
 
We now turn to the relation between income and smoking across countries.  There is a 
rich body of evidence on the income elasticity of demand for cigarettes.  Unfortunately, 
estimates from this literature differ substantially from study to study (Gallet and List, 
2002).  Given that our model suggests a possible non-monotonic relationship between 
income and cigarette consumption, the lack of a clear consensus on the income elasticity 
of smoking is not so surprising.    
 
Early estimates of the income elasticity of smoking were based on national time series or 
cross-state information.  For example, Maier (1955) reports generally positive income 
elasticities using cross state data.  Gallet and List (2002) report 24 papers estimating 
income elasticities for tobacco using state or provincial data; the median income elasticity 
across these estimates is .3.   
 
We have several ways to estimate the income elasticity of smoking.  One method is with 
international data.  Income and smoking rates are available for 75 countries.  Figure 8 
shows the relation between smoking and the log of per capita income in those countries.  
The regression line allows for a quadratic relationship, as suggested by the model.  The 
quadratic fits reasonably well: 
 
2
) 43 (. ) 36 . 7 ( ) 5 . 30 ( ) ln( 65 . 1 ) ln( 9 . 26 5 . 76 GDP GDP Smoking Share - + - = ;      R
2=.20. 
 
where ln(GDP) is the logarithm of per capita GDP in 2000 in U.S. dollars and standard 
errors are in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.  The maximum predicted value is 
reached at an income of $3,200.  The effect of a 1 log point increase in per capita GDP is 
-7.7 at the income of the U.S.  Even with its high income, however, the US is a negative outlier; smoking is lower in the US than one would expect by income alone. The residual 
for the US is about -6 percent. 
 
We can get a similar estimate of the income elasticity of spending using data from US 
states.  Figure 9 shows that the correlation between per capita income and smoking across 
states within the U.S. is negative.  A one log point increase in income is associated with a 
7.8 percent decrease in the smoking rate in a univariate regression.  This is very similar to 
the international data. 
 
Individual-based estimates of cigarette consumption show weaker estimates.  For 
example, Gallet and List (2002) report ten papers estimating the income elasticity of 
demand for tobacco using individual data, with the median elasticity estimate across 
those papers being .06, which is both small and positive.     
 
In Table 1, we show smoking rates across income quartile within the U.S. and Europe.  
We also show smoking rates by broad education category.  Smoking declines with 
income (or education) in the United States.  The difference is large; smoking rates for 
those in the top quintile are one-third lower than smoking rates for those in the bottom 
quintile.  In Europe the relationship between smoking and income is flat.  As a result, the 
gap between the U.S. and Europe is smallest among poorer individuals and greatest 
among the rich. 
 
Using the U.S. data, we estimate a non-linear income elasticity, where a discrete variable 
that takes on a value of one for regular smokers is regressed on country dummies and the 
logarithm of income and the logarithm of income squared.
8  The probit regression yields 
the estimate: 
 
Dummies Country Income Income Smo + - =
2
) 019 (. ) 372 (. ) ln( 024 . ) ln( 330 . ker ;    
 
                                                 
8 Only monthly income is asked about in the Eurobarometer data.  To get a more precise income elasticity, 
we use the annual data available in the U.S. There are 15,213 observations.  The coefficients on income and income squared are not 
statistically significant.  They are also somewhat smaller than the national data.  An 
increase in incomes of $10,000 per person would reduce smoking rates by 2.1 percent.   
 
It is not completely clear what income elasticity to use for the US-Europe comparison.  
We consider first the elasticity in the international data.  The mean income of the 
European countries that we have included is about $25,000 dollars in 2000.  The U.S. 
income in the same year is about $36,000, for a difference of about 36 percent.  Using the 
equation above, this translates into a predicted difference in smoking rates of 2.6 percent 
(roughly .36*-7.7), or one-quarter of the total difference in smoking between the US and 
Europe.   
 
Our individual level estimates of the income elasticity of smoking are smaller than the 
macro estimates, so calculations using the micro estimates suggest that the income 
differences can explain even less of the cross-country differences.
9   Indeed, since the 
median income elasticity estimate shown by Gallet and List (2002) is positive, using that 
estimate would make the puzzle even larger.   
 
VI.  Differences in Beliefs about the Health Consequences of Smoking  
 
Finally, we turn to the impact of beliefs about smoking on smoking rates.  We start our 
analysis with survey evidence on beliefs about the health consequences of smoking, 
leaving aside for the moment where those beliefs come from.  In 1994, the 
Eurobarometer survey asked respondents whether they “tend to agree or disagree: 
smoking causes cancer and death”.  We code people who “tend to agree” as believing that 
smoking is harmful.  To match this with U.S. data, we used the 1994 National Survey of 
Drug Use and Health, which asks “how much people risk harming themselves physically 
and in other ways when they smoke one or more packs of cigarettes per day: no risk, 
                                                 
9 The non-linear relationship means that inequality should also be considered when looking at the smoking 
differences across countries.   We leave this for future work.   slight risk, moderate risk, or great risk?”  For comparability with the Eurobarometer 
questions, we consider people who think that smoking has a moderate or great risk.
10 
 
These particular survey questions are obviously imperfect.  Cancer is only one health 
consequence of smoking.  In many cases, the relevant question is not whether smoking 
causes cancer but rather the increased probability of developing cancer that results from 
smoking behavior.  Nonetheless, this is the best data that we have. 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of beliefs across countries about whether smoking causes 
cancer.  The first column reports the share of the entire population believing that smoking 
causes cancer.  The U.S. has one of the highest rates of believing that smoking is 
harmful; 91 percent of Americans report believing that smoking causes cancer.  Given the 
high proportion of Americans that believe in UFOs and the literal truth of the bible, this 
must represent one of the most remarkable instances of the penetration of scientific 
results in the country.  Beliefs about the cancer-causing role of cigarettes in some 
European countries, like Finland, Greece, Norway, and Portugal, are almost identical to 
those in the U.S., but in other places beliefs are far weaker.  For example in Germany 
only 73 percent of respondents said that they believed that smoking causes cancer.  
 
One possible interpretation of this data is that exogenous trends in smoking affects beliefs 
about the harms of cigarettes, through a form of cognitive dissonance.  Smokers may 
persist in believing that cigarettes don’t cause cancer because their habits are more 
justifiable if they refuse to believe that there are health consequences of their actions.  To 
address this, columns 2 and 3 show beliefs about the harms of smoking among non-
smokers and smokers respectively.  This concern does not appear to be evident.  Both 
smokers (83 percent) and non-smokers (94 percent) in the US strongly believe that 
smoking   By contrast, 52 percent of German smokers and 84 percent of German non-
smokers shared that belief.  Beliefs appear to be specific to the society, much more than o 
the individual who smokes or not.   
                                                 
10 It is not entirely clear what level of risk corresponds to “tend to agree” in the Eurobarometer data.  One 
might also include those who believe there is a slight risk of smoking.  In this case, the beliefs about the 
harms of smoking would be higher still in the United States.  
An added piece of evidence supporting the view that Europeans and Americans differ in 
their beliefs about smoking is the differential relationship between income and smoking 
in the US and Europe.  The model above emphasized the cross-effect between beliefs and 
income.  If smoking is thought to be harmful, then we should particularly see high 
income people avoid smoking, because they have a greater demand for healthy life.  This 
is exactly what table 1 shows; in comparison to Europe, it is the richer groups of the US 
population who smoke the least.   
 
We use several methods to quantify the impact that these beliefs differences have on the 
smoking rate.  We begin with time series evidence and then turn to cross-individual, 
cross-state and cross-country evidence.  Lung cancer did not become prevalent in the US 
until cigarette use became relatively common.  As seen in Figure 3, this occurred in the 
first third of the 20
th century.  Thus, scientific evidence about the link between smoking 
and cancer dates from that era.  The first published article alleging a link between 
cigarette smoking and lung cancer appeared in the American Journal of Cancer in 1932 
(McNally, 1932).  The article was relatively speculative, though; more concrete evidence 
linking cigarettes and cancer was published eighteen years later by Wynder and Graham 
(1950) in the Journal of the American Medical Association.  This was followed by a 1954 
Sloan-Kettering study that reported experiments where tar from cigarettes had caused 
cancerous tumors in mice (Sloan-Kettering, 1954).   
 
Popular knowledge about the harms of smoking almost certainly dates from Readers’ 
Digest, which ran an article in 1952 titled “Cancer by the Carton.”  The news was picked 
up by other newspapers and media outlets, including even Edward R. Murrow’s (a 
particularly famous smoker) See It Now television program. These early reports and the 
related publicity created the first cigarette cancer scare in the early 1950s.  The 1950s saw 
nascent public beliefs form about the harms of smoking.  In a January 1954 Gallup 
survey, 41 percent of people answered ‘yes’ to the question “Do you think cigarette 
smoking is one of the causes of lung
 cancer, or not?”   
 Figure 3 shows the time path of cigarette smoking during this time period.  From 1933 to 
1952, cigarette smoking rose every year.  Indeed, between 1920 and 1952, cigarette 
consumption fell only during the bleakest years of the great depression (confirming the 
positive income elasticity of cigarette consumption at lower income levels).  Between 
1952 and 1954, cigarette smoking took its first dramatic drop.  From 1952-1953 smoking 
dropped by 3 percent, followed by an additional 6 percent the following year.  While it is 
possible that this drop was due to something other than changing beliefs about the health 
risks of cigarettes, contemporary observers certainly thought that the decline in smoking 
was the result of the health scare.  For example, the treasurer of the American Tobacco 
Company said in 1954 that “there is a tendency to ascribe the drop in cigarette 
consumption almost entirely to the so called ‘cancer scare’.” (New York Times, May 7, 
1954, p.35).   
 
The reaction in the marketplace proceeded along several dimensions.  On the one hand, 
manufacturers and the public responded by making cigarettes somewhat safer.  Use of 
filtered cigarettes rose from less than 2 percent in 1952 to more than 20 percent in 1955.  
Edward R. Murrow on the air linked the rise of filtered cigarettes to heightened fears 
about the dangers of cigarettes.  On the other hand, the cigarette industry fought back 
through advertising.  Using their vast advertising budgets and spending on their own rival 
research (which unsurprisingly found that cigarettes were harmless), cigarette companies 
were able to overcome the negative publicity associated with these early studies.  
Smoking rose again from 1954 through 1963.   
 
Increasing evidence in the medical community showed the harms from smoking, and in 
1964, the Surgeon General issued his famous warning about the health consequences of 
smoking.  In 1966, the Federal Trade Commission required cigarettes to be sold with a 
label warning that “cigarettes may be hazardous to your health.”  Both the federal 
government and private groups like the American Cancer Society mounted campaigns 
meant to increase awareness of the health consequences of smoking.  The fruits of this 
campaign are apparent in public opinion surveys.  In 1960, 50 percent of Americans 
believed that cigarette smoking was one of the causes of lung cancer.  By 1969, the share was 71 percent (Cutler and Kadiyala, 2003).  One sees this in the consumption data as 
well.  In 1964 alone, cigarette smoking fell by 3 percent, and smoking was down by 8 
percent by 1970.   
 
Since the 1950s, beliefs about the harms of smoking have cemented.  The Gallup 
Organization (Gallup, 1981) documented a rising belief that smoking was dangerous.  By 
the 1980s, Viscusi (1992) finds that people actually overestimated the health risks of 
smoking.  As noted above, over 90 percent of Americans now believe that smoking 
causes cancer.  
 
A strong circumstantial case links the decline of smoking to the expansion of information 
about the harms of smoking.  In addition to figure 3, data on the share of people who 
have ever smoked show a decline beginning in cohorts coming of smoking age after 
1964.  Other evidence about the link between perception and smoking comes from 
individual correlations between beliefs and actions.  Smoking rates among those who 
believe that smoking a pack or more of cigarettes per day has a great risk are only 23 
percent, compared to 52 percent among those who do not believe that link.
11  If beliefs 
causally affect smoking (and not the reverse, as with cognitive dissonance), it suggests a 
large impact of beliefs on actions.   
 
One way to get around the reverse relationship between smoking and beliefs is to 
consider subsets of the population where beliefs are not reflective of actions.  
Specifically, we consider how smoking rate in a state or country is related to the beliefs 
of non-smokers about the harms of smoking.  Of course, if beliefs are formed through a 
social learning process, then the beliefs of non-smokers in high smoking states may 
reflect the influence of other variables that are related to smoking.  But we do not have 
any obvious alternative to this strategy.   
 
                                                 
11  In a probit regression, where we also control for age, gender, race education and income, the effect of 
believing that smoking is a great risk drops to 27 percent.   Figure 10 shows cross-state data on smoking rates and the share of non-smokers who 
believe that smoking is a great risk.
12  There is a clear negative relation between the two.  
A one percent increase in the share of non-smokers who think that cigarettes cause cancer 
is associated with a 0.6 percent decrease in the share of people who smoke cigarettes.  
This cross- state relationship is robust to controlling for income, price, a regulation index, 
education and a dummy variable for states that produce tobacco. The coefficient on 
beliefs drops only to .5 including all of these controls.  
   
We complement the analysis across US states with cross-country evidence.  Figure 11 
shows the relationship across countries between the share of non-smoking respondents 
who believe that cigarettes cause cancer and the share of smokers.
13  The regression line 
is negative and roughly the same magnitude as the state data; a one percent increase in 
the share of the population that thinks that cigarettes causes cancer is associated with a 
.47 percent decrease in the share of the population that smokes.  Because of the small 
number of observations, the coefficient is not statistically significant.    
  
If one assumes that beliefs are formed independently of smoking rates, we can use these 
estimates and ask how much of the difference between U.S. and European cigarette 
consumption is associated with differences in beliefs.  The difference in beliefs between 
the U.S. and Europe is about 7 percentage points overall and 4 percent among non-
smokers.  Using the state level estimate of the impact of beliefs on smoking or the 
international evidence, the more widespread belief about the harms of smoking explains 
between 2 and 4 percent lower smoking rates in the US – the former taking only the 
difference in beliefs among non-smokers and the latter taking the difference in beliefs 
overall.  These translate into 20 and 40 percent of the total smoking difference across 
countries.  On the whole, our evidence suggests that differences in beliefs are the most 
important factor explaining the differences in smoking between the U.S. and Europe.   
 
 
                                                 
12  Note that the mean differs from Table 4 because we use only the share of people reporting that smoking 
is a great risk, rather than a great or moderate risk.  We do this to highlight the certainty of beliefs. 
13  We use Eurobarometer data for smoking rates, since we are using the beliefs data from that survey. VII.  Conclusion 
 
There is a dramatic difference in smoking rates between the U.S. and Europe.  This 
difference is largest for the most educated and richest members of the two regions, but 
applies throughout the distribution.  This difference is not longstanding, and it exists 
despite the fact that along many other dimensions (witness obesity) Europeans are far 
healthier than Americans.  
 
There is no evidence that this difference is the result of cigarette taxes or direct 
government regulation of cigarettes.  Cigarettes are taxed more highly in Europe than in 
the United States.  Some of the difference between the U.S. and Europe – perhaps a 
quarter – is the result of higher U.S. incomes.  There appears to be something of smoking 
Kuznets curve where cigarette consumption first rises and falls with income.  Both the 
US and Europe are on the downward slope of the Kuznets curve, where higher incomes 
are associated with less smoking.   
 
The most important factor, however, appears to be differences in beliefs about the health 
consequences of smoking between the U.S. and Europe.  Ninety-one percent of 
Americans think that cigarettes cause cancer; only 84 percent of Europeans share that 
view.  Using different estimates of the relation between beliefs and cigarette 
consumption, we estimate that this difference can explain between one-quarter and one-
half of the total smoking difference between the U.S. and Europe.  Moreover, the history 
of cigarettes within the U.S. suggests that American beliefs about smoking seemed to 
come about only after substantial information about the harms of smoking were presented 
– first by private researchers, then by the Federal government.  ‘Soft paternalism’
14 is a 
major factor in lower rates of smoking.   
 
The possibility of a feedback from smoking to beliefs about smoking suggests that the 
impact of this information may be even larger than we have estimated.  In areas where 
                                                 
14  We distinguish information campaigns from ‘hard paternalism’, including regulating smoking and 
raising taxes. fewer people smoke, non-smoker sentiment might be stronger, leading to a further 
reduction in cigarette use.   
 
As a final thought, it is worth wondering why the U.S., with its lower propensity towards 
regulation and paternalism generally, had more effective interventions in the changing of 
beliefs about smoking.   U.S. smoking history suggests that entrepreneurial actions on the 
part of anti-smoking interest groups were quite important.  Initially, the American 
Medical Association and later organizations specifically focused on cancer and heart 
disease effectively used the market for ideas both directly to influence beliefs and 
indirectly, by influencing the government.  By contrast, European pressure groups were 
much weaker and less effective at influencing public opinion and policy.  According to 
this view, while greater U.S. entrepreneurship and economic openness led to more 
smoking during an earlier era (and still leads to more obesity today), it also led to faster 
changes in beliefs about smoking and ultimately less cigarette consumption.   
 References 
 
Akerlof, George, and William Dickins, “The Economic Consequences of Cognitive 
Dissonance.” American Economic Review, 72(3), June 1982, 307-19. 
 
Baltagi, Badi H., and Dan Levin, “Estimating Dynamic Demand for Cigarettes Using 
Panel Data: The Effects of Bootlegging, Taxation and Advertising Reconsidered” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1986, 68(1), February 148-155. 
 
Becker, Gary S., Michael Grossman, and Kevin M. Murphy, “An Empirical Analysis of 
Cigarette Addiction,” The American Economic Review, 1994, 84(3), June, 396-418. 
 
Becker, Gary S. and Kevin M. Murphy, Social Economics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000.  
 
Chaloupka, Frank J., “Rational addictive behavior and cigarette smoking”, Journal of 
Political Economy 1991, 99(4), August, 722-742.  
 
Cutler, David M., and Edward L. Glaeser, “What Explains Differences in Smoking, 
Drinking, and Other Health-Related Behaviors?” American Economic Review, May 2006. 
 
Cutler, David M., and Srikanth Kadiyala, “The Return to Biomedical Research: 
Treatment and Behavioral Effects,” in Kevin Murphy and Robert Topel, eds., Measuring 
the Gains from Medical Research: An Economic Approach, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003. 
 
Evans, William N, Matthew C. Farrelly, and Edward Montgomery, “Do Workplace 
Smoking Bans Reduce Smoking?” The American Economic Review, 1999, 89(4), 
September, 728-747. 
 
Gallet, Craig A., and John A. List, “Cigarette Demand: a Meta-Analysis of Elasticities,” 
Health Economics, 2003, 12(1), October, 821-835. 
 
Gallup, George. “Smoking Rates Decline as More Perceive Health Hazard,” Gallup 
Organization Mimeograph, 1981. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L., Bruce Sacerdote, and Jose Schenkman, “The Social Multiplier”, 
Journal of the European Economics Association, 2003, 1(2), 345-353. 
 
Guindon, GE, S Tobin, and D Yach, “Trends and Affordability of Cigarette Prices: 
Ample Room for Tax Increases and Related Health Gains.” Tobacco Control 2002, 11 
(1): 35–43. 
 
Lyon, Herbert L., and Julian L. Simon, “Price Elasticity of the Demand for Cigarettes in 
the United States”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1968, 50(4), 
November, 888-895.  
Maier, Frank A., “Consumer Demand for Cigarettes Estimated from State Data,” Journal 
of Farm Economics, 1955, 37(4), November, 690-704. 
 
McNally, William D. “The Tar in Cigarette Smoke and its Possible Effects.” American 
Journal of Cancer 1932; 16:1502-1514. 
 
Schoenberg, Erika H., “The Demand Curve for Cigarettes”, Journal of Business, 6, 1933, 
15-33. 
 
Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research, “Progress Report VIII,” 1954. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision: New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992. 
 
Wynder, Ernst L., and Evarts Graham, “Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic Factor 
in Bronchiogenic Carcinoma: a Study of 684 Proven Cases.” JAMA, 1950;143:329-36. 
 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: At  ( ) ( ) ( ) C P Y U Y U
Y U







* , the utility from 
smoking and not smoking are equal.  Since the utility from smoking is monotonically and 
continuously increasing in S, and the utility from not smoking is independent of S, for 
values of S>S*, smoking strictly dominates not smoking and for values of S<S*, not 
smoking strictly dominates smoking.   
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Proof of Proposition 3: Within any two groups, the impact of an increase in D on the 















S f .  If S is 





 times a negative constant.  
Differentiation shows that this quantity is clearly greater for groups with more income, 
higher values of b  and higher values of d .   
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Within any two groups, the impact of an increase in  C P  on the 
share of the group that smokes will equal   ( ) C
C
P Y U S f
P
S
S f - - =
¶
¶
- ' *) (
*
*) ( .  If S is 
uniformly distributed then this becomes  ( ) C P Y U - '  times a negative constant.  This is 
declining in Y and independent of b  and d .  
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Now  ( ) ( ) ( ) s smo C Share g P Y U Y U
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ker , so the equation can be solved to yield:  
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for  C P , b , d  and D respectively.    All of these are decreasing in g, so as g gets larger 
the impact of all of these variables on aggregative smoking consumption will increase.  
Furthermore, the ratio of the relationship between these variables across subgroups within 
country to the relationship between these variables and smoking across countries will 

















































Figure 1: Smoking Rates in Developed Countries, 2000
 
 




































Figure 2: Obesity Rates in Developed Countries, 2000
 
  Source: OECD Health Statistics.  Data are for about 2000 in all countries. 
  
 
































  Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
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  Source: World Health Organization.  
 










































  Source: World Health Organization.  Regression excludes Greece. 
  
 




























  Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
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  Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Census Bureau.  The 





Figure 10: Smoking and The Beliefs of Non-Smokers About 
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  Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Survey of Drug 
Use and Health. 
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  Source:  Authors’ tabulations of Eurobarometer survey data and National Survey 





Table 1:  Smoking Rates in Developed Countries (percent) 





1994  Top  2
nd  3





Austria  29  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Belgium  30  30  30  35  30  28  30  30 
Denmark  31  42  34  48  44  38  42  46 
France  27  37  37  36  37  37  41  34 
Finland  23  30  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Greece  38  36  41  41  40  22  44  31 
Germany  35  32  36  33  30  27  34  32 
Ireland  32  30  32  28  32  30  26  35 
Italy  24  30  28  32  29  28  33  29 
Luxembourg  30  29  25  21  36  36  29  29 
Netherlands  32  40  36  35  38  45  43  39 
Norway  31  34  --  --  --  --  32  44 
Portugal  21  25  32  24  28  11  37  22 
Spain  34  34  30  38  38  24  42  31 
Sweden  19  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Switzerland  31  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
UK  27  31  20  32  32  33  22  36 
European 
average 
30  33  32  34  35  30  35  33 
US  19  23  21  24  29  31  22  25 
Source: Official smoking data for 2000 are from the World Health Organization’s Health 
for All Database, and are generally compiled from national surveys.  All other data are 
authors’ tabulations.  European data are from Eurobarometer and are for the population 
aged 15+ in 1994.  US data are from the National Survey of Drug Use and Health and are 
also for the population aged 15+ in 1994.  Germany is West Germany, and the UK 
includes Northern Ireland.  The European average is for countries that have complete 
data (e.g., excluding Norway).   
  
Table 2: Cigarette Prices in the US and Europe 
Country 
Price after tax 
of local brand 
(US$)  Tax (US$) 
Price Relative 
to Bread 
Austria  3.04  2.22  1.5 
Belgium  2.93  2.20  1.5 
Denmark  4.00  3.36  1.9 
Finland  3.35  2.45  1.0 
France  2.75  2.06  1.1 
Germany  2.75  1.98  1.9 
Greece  1.64  1.20  1.7 
Ireland  4.47  3.35  1.9 
Italy  1.93  1.41  0.9 
Luxembourg  1.90  --  0.9 
Netherlands  2.56  1.84  1.7 
Norway  6.48  5.05  2.7 
Portugal  1.77  1.43  1.7 
Spain  1.15  0.83  1.2 
Sweden  3.64  2.51  1.5 
Switzerland  2.80  1.46  1.2 
UK  6.25  4.88  6.7 
European average  3.22  2.39  1.9 
US  3.60  0.86  1.2 
Sources:  World Health Organization “The Tobacco Atlas” 2002.  
Guindon, Tobin, Yach 2002.  The UK includes Northern Ireland.  




   
Table 3: Cigarette Regulation in the US and Europe 
    Smoke Free Workplace 
Country  Total  Government  Private  Restaurants 
Austria  2.0  1.0  1.0  0.0 
Belgium  2.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
Denmark  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0 
Finland  2.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
France  2.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
Germany  1.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Greece  2.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
Ireland  3.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Italy  3.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Luxembourg  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Netherlands  2.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
Norway  3.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Portugal  2.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
Spain  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0 
Sweden  2.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
Switzerland  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0 
UK  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.5 
European average  1.97  0.76  0.76  0.44 
US  1.05  0.49  0.25  .31 
Sources:  World Health Organization, Tobacco Control Database, CDC 








Table 4: Belief Differences Across Countries 
  Percent Believing Smoking is Harmful 
Country  Total  Non-Smokers  Smokers 
Belgium  78  85  63 
Denmark  85  91  78 
Finland  91  95  81 
France  82  89  72 
Germany  73  84  52 
Greece  91  96  83 
Ireland  85  91  73 
Italy  77  85  57 
Luxembourg  86  92  73 
Netherlands  81  87  72 
Norway  90  94  83 
Portugal  92  94  84 
Spain  84  86  78 
UK  87  92  75 
European average  84  90  73 
US  91  94  83 
Sources: Authors tabulations.  European data are from 
Eurobarometer and are for 1994.  US data are from the General 
Social Survey and are for 1994.  Germany is West Germany.  UK 
includes Northern Ireland. 
 
 
 
 